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Introduction
The results of nearly a century of industrialization in Brazil are an open invitation to controversy. A writer keen on painting a rosy picture could, for instance, draw attention to its exceptional growth record, which until the 1980s compared favourably with most LDCs. He could also point out that Brazil has a large and diversified manufacturing sector, whose value-added ranked seven in the world in 1988; and whose export performance over 1965-80 reached East Asian standards. Yet, it would not be difficult to paint a gloomy picture either. Industrialization was accompanied by rising inflation, by the build-up of the externai debt and by the worsening of the income distribution. By 1980, the signs of serious resource misallocation were ali too obvious, with 35.4 percent of the workforce underemployed (Wells, 1987, p. 96) . To complete the picture, in the 1980s output and manufactured export growth fell sharply to well below the LDC's averag~.
This sort of disparate results has been generally associated in the literature with an inward-oriented policy regime with lapses of outward orientation. Rather unsurprisingly, neoclassicals credit the goodresults to the allegedly export-oriented, hands-off periods of the govemment's policy, and the bad ones to those when import substitution (lS) and selec-tive intervention prevailed. The arguments are well known. Outward-orientation would have led, inter alia, to better resource alloeation, econotnies of scale and technological dynamism. Conversely, IS and its selective policies would have, inter alia, distorted resource alloeation, hampered exports, and promoted oligopolistic markets, rent-seek behaviour and technological backwardness.
Structuralists, in turn, emphasize the role of IS in building a diversified industrial structure, in overcotning supply inelasticities, and in boosting growth. It is acknowledged that the IS hurts exports, but the bad results, particularly of the 1980s, would have come from the side of macroeconomic failure, not a debilitating sectoral misallocation, as Fishlow (1990, p. 66) put it. Sceptical of export-promotion strategies, they argue that the State has failed to back up IS with sound fiscal and monetary policies.
Although there are merits in these interpretations, they both have important drawbacks. Neoelassicals correctly draw attention to the benefits of a more open economy, but underestimate the market failures facing the Brazilian govemment. On the other hand, structuralists rightly point out that, given the market failures, govemment intervention was vital. However, they do not address the point that under an inward-oriented regime, the diagnosing and correction of market failures was far from satisfactory, leading to often misguided and wholesale govemment interventions. This, in turn, set the stage for much of the macroeconomic failures.
Ali things considered, this paper seeks to show that the mixed results of Brazil's industrialization can be better understood if we foeus on the role of govemment in overcoming market failures. The underlying assumption is that the degree of industrialization success in LDCs varies in direct proportion to the efficiency with which the govemment has tackled imperfections in product -externalities and static and dynamic economies of scale -and factor markets -externalities and infonnational related failures. 1 The analysis is divided into five sections, broadly reflecting the evolution of the govemment's policies towards industrialization. That is, the minimalist govemment ofthe pre-1956 period, the 1956-63 IS strategy; the pseudo-neoelassical revolution of 1964-73; the neo-IS strategy during 1974-79; and the complete lack of direction of the 1980s.
lhe "unintentional" industrialization: the pre-1956 period
When the fií"St significant surge of manufacturing investment took place in the 1890s, Brazil could be dest;ribed as an open, export-oriented and agricultural-based economy, with its trade-GDP ratio standing roughly at 28 percent. At that time, agriculture accounted for 56 percent of GDP, whereas industry (12 percent of GDP) consisted mostly of small establishments in the textile and food sectors. Manufactured exports were virtually inexistent, with coffee accounting for as much as 60 percent of total exports (IBGE, 1990) .
Half a century later, though, the picture was somewhat different. The industry's share of GDP had climbed to 30 peréent and the manufacturing-import ratio had dropped from 45 percent to an amazing 10 percent. Yet, Brazil's industrial structure was still shallow and lacking diversification. The share of the so-called heavy industries was only 35 percent and coffee still accounted for 60 percent of total exports. 2 Overall. the economy had significantly reduced its dependence on foreign trade. halving the trade-ODP ratio to around 7 percento To use a cliché. Brazil had completed in mid-l95Os the IS easy stage.
The govemment's role in this first phase of the industrialization is a matter of controversy. but most authors seem to agree that. whatever it was. it has changed markedly after the Oreat Depression. It makes sense. then, to look at these two periods -pre and postOreat Depression -separately.
Before the Great Depression
The dominant view in the literature is that lhe govemment's role in the first steps of Brazil's industrialization was minimal. or to put it differently. that industrialization was the result of relative price changes provoked by externaI shoeks. and/or the product of linkages between the coffee and manufacturing sectors. 3 No doubt. this perception seems to square with lhe liberal rhetoric of the fltSt Republican govemments and their agrarian political base. 4 The fly in the ointment. though. are evidences suggesting. first. that tariffs were anything but low. and secando that the State has granted incentives and subsidies. notably. to the heavy industry. Table 1 . for instance. shows a significant. if not monotonic. increase in lhe actual tariff rates since the independence. to leveis that cannot be outright dismissed as negligible. Other incentives seem to have included tariff exemptions for capital good imports. a law of similar (1890) which prohibited tariff exemptions for goods produced domestically. and loans and profit-guarantees for heavy industries. Table 1 Brazil's actual tariff rates * -1823-1955 (%) 1823-32 1833-82 1893-1902 1903-12 1913~22 1923-32 1933-42 1943-50 1951-55 * Tariff rcvenuc divided by total imports. Aritbmetic avcrage.
Source: Silva, G. A. A refonna aduaneira no Brasil. Estudos Aduaneiros. Esaf, Bmsília (11), 1983 , as quotcd by Machado (1990) .
However. these evidences are played down on the grounds that they do not prove that the govemment was systematically pursuing industrialization. nor that the measures taken were effective. Much ammunition is spent on tariffs whose main purpose is thought to have been fiscal. and whose impact is believed to have been limited given that they were specific. and tended to be offset by intemational prices and exchange rate fluctuations. As to the other incentives, the claim is that they were not used in a systematic fashion, and had more of a de jure than a de facto existence (Suzigan. 1984) .
Strong as these arguments may be, it seetns difficult to deny that relative price changes received a valuable, if modest, assistance of govenunent's incentives. Particularly if one takes into account that productivity in the light industry was apparently well below the international frontier.' The long arm of coincidence would have to be stretched too far to explain why lhe first spurts of manufacturing investment occurred only after quui .. free .. tndc agre@.
ments with Portugal and England had expired. 6 This does not imply, however, that State was developmental. In fact, the limited service that it rendered industry by raising tariffs and giving incentives appears to have been more than offset by its inaction regarding market failures in the fmancial markets, infrastructure, education and science and technology (S&T).
Over the period, the fmancial sector remained basically geared to cater for the coffeeexport sector, and there was virtually no source of long-tenn credit for manufacturing. The govenunent played an important role in expanding the infrastructure, yet, as these investments were mainly targeted to serve the coffee-export sectot (concentrated in the SouthEast), they neither provided industry with access to a unified national market; nor with an adequate energy supply. As to education, despite being free and compulsory, the share of total population eitrolled in school in 1930 (6.3 percent) was well below the already dismal Latin America's average (8 percent) (Albert, 1983, p. 38) . Finally, govenunent action in the area of S&T did not go beyond a few specialized institutions in the engmeering and biomedical fields, with virtually no links with industry.
After the Great Depression
In the post-1930 period, the govenunent's hand became more visible, but the main targets were balance of payment (BP) adjustment and fuII employment, and not industrlalization. Most accounts give trade policies the pride of place. In fact, these policies took the classical contours of an IS strategy. Instead of pursuing an orthodox BP-adjustment with exchange rate devaluation and fiscal-cum-monetary contraction, the govenunent opted for a different package that included the fonner but not the latter.
7 Given the sire of the foreign exchange gap, this policy mix had to be complemented by foreign exchange and import controls. The success of this strategy in adjusting the BP, boosting growth and promoting manufacturing investment left a pennanent mark in Brazilian policymakers. From then on, import and foreign exchange controls would be a key element of the govenunent's policies whatever the incwnbents' ideological colours.
During 1930-55, import and exchange rate controls took different forros and were combined with different exchange rate policies, gradually becoming more favourable to industry. Custotns tariffs were left playing second fiddle. These policies are seen to have helped industry in two main ways. First, by restricting import competition, particularly to the light industry, allowing local firros not only,to survive and learn, but also to grow ahead of income through IS. Second, by subsidizing imports of capital goods and raw material with a highly overvalued exchange rate. 8 The changes in the import structure -with the conswnption goods' share falling from 21 to 10 percent over 1930-55 -, the already mentioned abrupt decline in the import ratio, and the annual growth rate of 8.4 percent for manufacturing output alI tend to support these arguments. 9 However, the cost involved were no less visible. One could mention, for instance, the much-heralded rent-seeldng and static costs of protection. These costs, however, can be said to have been attenuated, first, by the fact that the light industries remained dominant, very much in line with Brazil's factor endowment. Secand, because the introduction, in 1953, of an auction system for import licenses, reduced the opportunity for rent seeldng. And third, because the welfare gains associated with rapid growth have probably made up for the consumer loss. Mo~· damaging losses were inflicted on two other interrelated issues, Le., the . industry's efficiency and the externai balance.
Economic theory has already shown that the replacement of tariffs for non-tariff barriers (NTBs) leads to non-competitive behaviour, aggravating the infant industry problems of X-inefficiency and endless-leaming periods. The experience of countries like Korea, however, also suggests that these problems can be largely avoided, and monopolistic behaviour even turned into a positive factor, if protection is made conditional on export performance, forcing firms into the international market (Moreira, op. cit.) . In Brazil, during 1930-55, competition from imports ~as totally removed but nothing was put in place to push firms down the leaming curve. Finns had, then, incentives to fill the gaps left by imports, but little incentive to increase efficiency given the technologically poor domestic competition.
With the wrong set of incentives, the manufacturing-export ratio collapsed from 9 to 2.3 percent over 1907-49, and in 1955 this figure must have been even lower, given that during 1950-55 manufacturing output has outperfonned manufactured exports by a large margin. This lack of incentives also led to a BP increasingly dependent on coffee exports, and therefore exposed to the vagaries of a very unstable market.
These trade policy distortions were aggravated by the government's belated and unsatisfactory response to the industry's growing requirements for infrastructure, financing and human capital. It was not until the early 1950s that effective steps were taken to tackle some of these market failures. An exception to this rule was the State's direct intervention in the production of intennediary goods in the late 1930s. Although this move had little to do with an industrialization strategy -it was prompted mainly by military reasons related to World War n -and was carried out only when the State had nm out of private options, it would later prove to be economically sound.
But going back to the industry's needs, the State's actions in the area of infrastructure were hampered by a government tom between the virtues of public and private investments, and ending up with the worst of both worlds. Key sectors such as electric power and telecommunications were in private hands (mainly foreign companies), but were regulated by state and municipal governments that constantly imposed unrealistic rates. The result was low and uncoordinated investments. On the other hand, services that had passed to public hands (e.g. railways) tended to suffer from the lack of long-tenn planning and the State's inadequate financiai and fiscal base. It was only in the early fifties that a clear option for public sector investments emerged, with key State enterprises (SEs) being created, particularly in the energy sector (oil and electric power). Major investm.ents, however, would only begin in 1956.
On the financiai side there was little progress, if at all. Oovemment intervention, to a certain extent, was more of a hindrance than a help. For instance, the development of the financiai sector was considerably delayed by the ill-conceived usuty law (1933) , which limited the maximum rate of interest to an annual rate of 12 percent. nus, coupled with inflation averaging 13 percent annually over 1940-55, led the financiai sector to shrink exactly when rapid industrialization was demanding the opposite. As a result, industry ended up without both long-tenn financing and short-tenn funds for working capital. Without proper credit, and with a negligible stock market, finns had to increasingly rely on internai finance, whose limits were pushed by constant, increasingly elusive, attempts to raise mark-ups. In this endeavour, finns were helped not only by the trade policy but also by a lax monetary policy.
TIrls disastrous intervention contrasted sharply with a more positive, if timid, move to provide industry with long-tenn loans. This carne in 1952, with the establishment of a development bank (National Development Bank -BNDE). Industry, however, had to wait until the mid-1950s to benefit from a significant share of its loans (most of them went for infrastructure), and even then the lion's share went to the government-owned heavy industries.
Finally, S&T and education continued not to figure among the government's priorities even though important, if uncoordinated, steps were taken in the area of higher education and training (World Bank, 1979) . Overall, though, no substantial improvement appears to have occurred. As of 1950, 50 percent of the population were still illiterate.
3. Heavy industry "at ali costs": the 1956-64 period As shown, more than half a century of unintentional and inward looking industrialization had good results in terms of growth but gave rise to an industry of dubious quality, suffering from distorted incentives and burdened by serious bottlenecks in infrastructure, fmancing and human capital. However, it was not until the mid-1950s that industrialization became part of the government's agenda. nus event was marked by the Targets Plan (T plan) -1956-61. Inspired by Ecla's structuralism, the plan was nothing more than a collection of five-year targets for output and investment in infrastructure and heavy industry (Lessa, 1982) . It was not accompanied by any significant institutional change. Even though a National Development Council, with the initial purpose of acting as a central planning agency, was set up in 1956, it was soon fragmented into several sectoral agencies, the so-called executive groups.
These weaknesses were compounded by an inhospitable macroeconomic environment, marked by a two digit inflation -reflecting the high GDP growth (8 percent in 1955) and the lack of proper funding for investments -and a worrying BP situation -the result of an erratic export perfonnance, a rising debt-service and falling terms of trade. In order to circumvent these constraints, the government went again for an eclectic policy mix, still dominated by trade and exchange rate policies, but this time other important ingredients were added, i.e., foreign capital and an a greater role for the State in infrastructure, intennediary goods and in the fmancial sector.
The govemment policies
Beginning with trade and exchange rate policies, there was little change in the dual purpose of avoiding a BP crisis and promoting IS. The aim to deepen the industrial structure, though, meant that import contrais were extended to most of the heavy industry. As a result, ali manufacturing sectors were given very high effective tariffs (table A.l), with the structure of protection reflecting essentially rather than comparative advantages. As before, the effective purchase-power-parity (PPP) exchange rate for imports continued to be substantially higher than that of exports.
This now traditional policy, though, was not enough to keep lhe plan afloat. Given the import intensity, and the capital and technological requirements of the heavy industry, a new element had to be brought in, i.e., foreign capital. To this end, the govemment refonned the already liberallegislation, dropping the remaining restrictions and offering lavish incentives.
1O Foreign capital responded quickly, with the annual inflows increasing threefold in the first years of the plan.
The third prong of the govemment's strategy involved, as noted earlier, an increase in the State's role in infrastructure, intennediary goods and financiaI sector. The public sector's share of the gross fixed capital formation rase from 26 to 33 percent over the 1947-55 and 1956-64 periods, led by SEs' investments in the steel industry and infrastructure. Likewise, the public sector's share oftotalloans went up from 26 (1951-55) to 36 percent (1956-63) , whereas as a lender, its share rose from 48 to 57 percent over the same period (Sumoc, various years) .
This expanded State presence in the financiaI sector did little to remedy capital market failures. Much of it reflected the inadequacy of the public sector's financing schemes. Despite its ambitious targets, the plan was short of specifics on how investments would be financed, and arrangements were virtually limited to the set up of various earmarked fiscal funds, placed under BNDE contraI. Even though this move, combined with the possibility of issuing foreign-Ioan guarantees, significantly increased BNDE resources, it proved to be thoroughly inadequate to the public and private sector's financiaI needs. ll In the case of the public sector, the lack of adequate fmancing was compounded by the SEs' unrealistic pricing policy, part of an ill-advised attempt by the govemment to contrai the rising inflation. As an increase in the national debt was not a viable option (the usury law made govemment bonds with positive returns an impossibility), the gap in the public sector's finances was almost entirely financed by monetary expansion (Sochaczewski, 1980) .
As to the private sector, whereas foreign fmns had access to foreign loans at preferential exchange rátes, local fmns continued to have problems in attanging long-tenn financing, due to their diminished creditworthiness. The BNDE's loans and guarantees were of little help since they were meagre and mostly directed towards the public sector. Local private finns (LPFs) continued, then, to resort to auto-finance via higher mark-ups, an option favoured by the lax monetary policy, but that became increasingly inefficient as inflation accelerated towards 30 percent in the late 1950s. Moreover, the supply of short-tenn funds was further restricted by the combination of high inflation with negative interest rates. 12 10 Scc Abreu (1990, p. 101) and Guimarães et alo (1982, appendix A.) 11 BNDE loans over 1956-64 averaged 2.2 pen:ent of the gross f1xed capital fonnation (Moreira, op. cil) .
12 In real tenns, outstanding dollK'Stic loans to the private sector remained stagnant over 1956-61, despite a twofold increase of GDP (Sumoc, various years) .
OOV1!RNMENT lNTERVENTION IN BRAZIL
AssesSing the results At first sigh~~ the plan's overall results point to a remarkable success. Most of the targets, either in infrastructure or manufacturing, were met within a reasonable margin of erTor (Lessa, 1982) . GDP and manufacturing output grew at annual average rates of 9.4 percent and 12 percent (1955-61), respectively. IS was successfully carried further down the road, notably in the heavy industry, whose import ratio reached 9 percent in 1964, and whose share of total manufacturing output rose from 35 to 48 percent ). Yet, the plan's main goal -a speedy move into the heavy industry -can be seriously questioned if the options involved, and the results achieved, ate examined more carefully.
Ç>ne can begin by arguing that in the mid-1950s there was hardly a sound case for a massive move into heavy industry. Looking ftrst from a static viewpoint, Brazil was far from any Lewisian tuming point as suggested by falling unit labour costs.1 3 Factor prices, therefore, were suggesting that resource allocation would be improved not by widespread . targeting of heavy industries, but by giving Iight industry the right incentives and finaitcial means to grow and seU in the international market. Instead, as we have seen, not only exports continued to be discriminated, but the Iight industry received only 2.6 petcent of the total BNDE manufacturing loans. As a result, both manufacturing employment growth and its elasticity were halved at a time when almost half of the work force was underemployed (table 2) . Table 2 Brazil's manufacturing employment elasticities -1939-84 1 1939-49 1949-59 1959-70 1970-75 1975-80 1970-80 0.6 (4.7) 0.3 (2.9) 0.6(4.0) 1.0 (11.7) 0.8 (5.2) 0.9(7.3) 1980-84
(-3.5)
ITotal cmployment growth dividcd by mal oulput growth. Compound 8DIl1l8l rales until 1970 and oIdinary least squue rales tbcreafter. Nmnbers in parenthcsis are manufacturing cmploymcnt growth. Source: IBGE, 1990. From a dynamic and, say, strategic perspective, it is true that a move towards the heavy industry was justifted, first, because of dynamic economies, particularly in technologically mature sectors, and second because of the human capital slipovers, higher ptoductivity and above-the-average-cost proftts, usually associated with this industry. However,to take full advantage of these beneftts, any attempt in this direction would have to allow for the limitations of the existing resource endowment, and for the market failures and imperfections that affect competition in this industry. This, not onIy to prevent beneftts being offset by excessive resources misallocation, in the static sense, but also to give LPFs realistic chances to grow and compete. '
Yet, as shown, the govemment overlooked ali these considerations .. Despite Brazil's poor capital and human capital resources, several sectors were targeted at once. Notwithstanding, the "Iumpiness", long-term maturation, and economies of scale that mark investment in this industry, very Iittle was done to centralize capital, either through the stock market or banking credit, and an excessive number of ptoducers was aUowed in. Despite the obvious limitations of the domestic market, backward integration, through domestic content 13 Unit labourcosts fell by 7 percent betwecn 1949 and 1959. See Moreira (op. cil) incentives, was excessively pursued. And finally, notwithstanding the industry's bigh technological and skill requirements, improvements in the S&T infrastructure and education remained out of the govemment's agenda. It was as if all these constraints and preconditions could have been quickly overcome by a large inflow of FOI. True enough, the targets were met and manufacturing growth was bigh, yet the costs seemed to have been too bigh.
Even though the analysis of FOI costs and benefits tends to be controversial, there seems to be a rare consensus in the literature regarding the inápplicability of the infant industry argument to TNe affiliates (e.g. Graham, 1991, and WestpI,al, 1982) . Even though these firms also face a learning curve and generate externalities, their untestricted access to capital and technology in the international market does not make them legitimate candidates for protection, The more 50 if one talces into account, first, that their access to parent company technology tends to exclude the know why from their contribution to domestic technological capabilities (Lall, 1992) ; second, that foreign ownersbip invalidates the welfare gains related to the profit-shifting argument (Brander, 1986) ; and third, that their protection is hardly compatible with that of those who really need to "mature", i.e., the LPFs.
Therefore, even though heavy reliance on protected FOI allowed the government to ignore the local constraints and the LPFs' human capital and financiaI needs, it ended up compromising much of the potential dynamic benefits involved in a heavy industry push. In fact, by taking this short cut, the govemment created a situation where, on the one band, the local firms were thoroughly exposed to the imperfect competition of the affiliates, and, despite the bighly protected internaI market, they had largely to settle for marginal or subcontractor positions, when not driven out of the market. And, on the other, the combination of high domestic prices and lax investment licensing led to the so-called "crowd in" effect. An inefficient industrial structure was then built -oversized vis-à-vis the domestic market but with most of the plants below the international mínimal efficient scale (MES) -heavily dependent on permanent protection, even though most. of the heavy industry sectors were either led or totally dominated by the most efficient producers of the world.
lhe pragmatic "miracle": the 1964-73 period
It was not long before Brazil had to pay the price for the shortcomings of the govemment's fust conscious áttempt to promote industrialization. The lack of proper financing and the trade bias led to bigh inflation and a BP crisis, wbich coupled with the polarization of the political situation resulted eventually in a military coup, in 1964. A new team of neoclassical policymakers, then, took over the command of the economy.
The new team set out to implement comprehensive institutional and policy reforms aimed at restoring "the supremacy of the price mechanism". In practice, as we shall see, theoretical principIes quickly gave way to a puzzling pragmatism, which did not altered in essence either the govemment's role or the previous pattem of industrialization. The reforms were largely designed to deal with two major issues -the inadequacy of the public and private sector financing, and the incentive-bias against exports -thought as the main causes of the chrqJÚc inflationary and BP problems. Moreover, at a less prominent leveI, there were also changes in the industrial and S&T policies.
Reforming public and private sector financing
Looking first at the public sector, a fiscal refonn was implemented to modernize taxes and proteet revenue from inflation, SEsi prices were adjusted, and eannarked, compulsory saving funds were set up to ftnance invesbnents in infrastructure and housing. In addition, a central bank was finally created, and the Treasury was allowed to issue bonds with monetary correction. As Sochaczewski (1980, p. 360) pointed out, this last measure allowed the govemment to circumvent the usury law, whose 12 percent ceiling was now reinterpreted as referring to the real and not the nominal rate. As a result, the State improved its control over the monetary policy, and significantly increased its resources, which became more in line with its new responsibilities in the infrastructure and intennediary goods industry, whose legitimacy was not questioned by the newcomers. On the contrary, SEs increased investment in these areas, doubling their share of gross fixed capital formation to 18.7 percent over 1965-73. As to the private sector, new non-banking financiai institutions and assets were created, and old ones refonned. The principal innovation was the introduction of assets with monetary correction, which, as with public bonds, would allow interest rates to be positive (Sochaczewski, 1980) . Foreign loans were also to be another important source of funds, and new legislation was enacted to expedite these operations. The immediate impact of these measures was a substantial increase in financiai savings that rose from 16 to 26 percent of GDP , sustained by a twofold increase in the financiai asset-to-GDP ratio and a stockmarket boom (World Bank, 1984, p. 11) .
Reforming the trade regime and foreign capital policy
Beginning with the trade regime, the govemment gradually moved towards a unified exchange rate via devaluation and removal of NTBs. In addition, a crawling-peg system was adopted, aiming at curbing speculation and reducing the real exchange fluctuations. These measures were accompanied by the implementation of export incentives, and by a selective import liberalization. On the export side, manufactured exports were exempted from indirect and income taxes, granted product-specific fiscal subsidies, a system of drawback was implemented, and heavily subsidized export credits were made available (Baumann & Braga, 1985) . Exports responded quickly, particularly manufactured exports, which grew 29 percent annually over the period, reaching 24 percent of total exports in 1974 (5 percent in 1964) .
On the import side, tariffs were reduced with the manufacturing average falling from 99 to 66 percent over 1966-73. In addition, tariff exemptions were extended to capital goods imports of priority sectors, irrespective of the market targeted, and an import processing zone was created in the Amazon region, which allowed the assembly of main1y electric and electronic consumer goods for the domestic market. However, legal and effective proteetion remained rather high and its inter-industrial structure unchanged (table A.l). The fact that the consumption goods share of imports remained negligible (4.3 percent in 1972) and the manufacturing import ratio showed a modest increase (from 6 to 8 percent over suggests that non-competitive, producer-goods imports were largely the sole beneficiaries of the liberalization.
With respect to foreign investment, the military aborted an attempt by the deposed . civilian govemment to impose restrictions. The manufacturing sector continued to be totally open to FOI, and foreign loans had no restrictions on the borrower's nationality or sector of activity (Guimarães et al., 1982) . In fact, the access to foreign loans was further facilitated with short-term loans being allowed to be registered and serviced. These measures, in conjunction with economic recovery, triggered off a new spurt of FOI and a rapid growth of the externai debt (11 percent annually over .
Changes in the industrial and S& T ·policies·
Despite the policy-makers' neoclassical credentials, the uncoordinated group of institutions that were the tools of the industrial and S&T "policies" during the T plan and earlier were not wound up but refonned; and on S&T, there was even an attempt to come up with a strategy worthy of the termo On the industrial side, the govemment set up, in 1964, the Industrial Development Council (CDI), made up of representatives of the main economic agencies, which were to incorporate the executive groups (see last section), and to co-ordinate and establish criteria for the concession of fISCal and credit incentives. These initial ambitions, though, never materialized. CDl's incentives were distributed without any clear criteria, but to increase investments. Moreover, there were at least a dozen regional and sector-specific govemment institutions, conceding similar incentives, with the cm having little or no control over them (Suzigan, 1978) .
As to S&T, it finally became, in 1968, an explicit policy aim. A National System of Scientific and Technological Development (SNDCT) was then set up, which would co-ordinate the existing S&T institutions and formulate S&T development plans. Particular emphasis was given to the need to develop more appropriate technologies to Brazil's re50urce endowment. This move was soon followed by a new emphasis on higher education, and by the screening of technology imports (1971) . The alleged motivation of this last measure was to reduce the cost of technology imports and to facilitate its absorption. Its impact, though, would only be felt in earneSt in the next period, in 50 far as it did not affect the contracts in force.
Behind the ·miracle"
These measures sparked off a new period of exceptional growth. GDP grew 10 percent annually over 1965-73, whereas manufacturing output reached 11 percent. Other indicators point to better resource allocation, with a substantial increase in labour absorption in manufacturing (table 2) , and a remarkable decline in incrementai capital output ratios (ICORs) (table A.2). There was also a considerable reduction in inflation that fell from around 90 to 16 percent over 1964-70, reflecting not only the reforms examined above, but al50 a rather heterodox stabilization program (1964-67), which combined a "stop-and-go" monetary policy with outright intervention in the labour market. Finally, the BP also improved -helped by the export take-off and the substantial inflow of foreign capital.
These impressive results prompted largely two sorts of reading. First, that they refl~cted industry reaching its maturity and, therefore, vindicated the previous IS strategy, and sec-ond, that they were the results of the new regime's outward orientation. 14 Apparently contradictory, these interpretations can be easily reconciled if we argue, for instance, that the "miracle" would not have been possible without, on the one hand, the capacity and capability building of the IS periad, and, on the other, the incentive changes and financial and fiscal refonns that put them to good use. Yet, even when cobbled together, these views can be misleading for two interrelated reasons. First, because despite being instrumental for export and economic growth, IS policies left a legacy that made a move towards an open economy costlier and economic growth unsustainable. And second, because it gives the wrong impression that the refonns taclded successfuUy the key shortcomings of Brazil's industrialization.
In order to clarify these points, we begin by looking at the changes in the trade regime and its results. Whereas the refonns reduced the bias against exports, they feU we11 short of turning Brazil into an outward-oriented economy. Growth accounting estimates show that exports played a minor role in the "miracle", accounting for not more than 6 percent of manufacturing grOwth (Baumann, 1985) . As a number of authors have already pointed out, the "miracle" was largely an internai matter, the upshot of the explosive combination of the industry's excess capacity, a consumer credit boom, and public sector's investment in infrastructure and housing (e.g. Serra, 1982) .
While there is nothing wrong in principIe with a domestic-market-led boom, the fact that manufactured exports remained marginal suggests that much of the old regime, and its drawbacks, were still in place. The govemment continued to give incentives and highly protect virtuaUy a11 manufacturing sectors. Inward, protected FOI continued to be encouraged, and to expand its presence increasingly at expense of the local finns.
1S With protection still high, the exchange rate remained overvalued. In other words, notwithstanding its liberal inclinations, the govemment's option was to maintain protection high enough not to upset the prevailing (inefficient) industrial structure, and to use subsidies to reduce the bias against exports.
While an apparently similar strategy was successful1y pursued by other NICs such as Korea, in Brazil, even though it succeeded in expanding manufactured exports, it tumed out to be rather costly (table 3) , and did not make exports more than a poor alternative to internai sales. The reasons for that seems to lie not so much in Brazil's "continental" market, but in three other factors: (a) whereas Korea made protection and incentives to industrialization conditional on export performance, Brazil relied solely on export subsidies; (b) whereas in Korea IS was selective, l>lants were built at international scale, and exporters were given full access to inputs at international prices; in Brazil, IS lacked selectivity, plants were built below the MES, and given the limitation of its drawback scheme, exporters had to shoulder the burden of an excessively backward-integrated industrial structure (table 3) .16 And, (c) unlike Korea, Brazil relied heavily on protected FOI, a strategy that made export diversifi-14 Sec, e.g., Tyler (1976) on lhe former, anel BaIassa (1979) on lhe Iatter.
IS In 1971, TNCs accolDltOO for more than 50 percent of the heavy industry sales, and for 45 percent of those of the wbole manufactming sectór (Moreira, 1994) . Morley Smith (1971) estimated lhat in 1965 tlús last figure was 33.5 percent. Moreover, whereas duriug 1956-60,33 percent of US-based TNCs were set up via takc-overs ofloca1 fllDlS, tlús percentage rose to 52 percent during 1966 -70, and to 61 percent during 1971{72 (Newfarmer, 1979 16 Drawback uscrs, IDlhl1975, would lose part of lhe flSClll subsidy, and both drawback and export incentives were conditional on localization indices above 70 percent (Pastore et aI., 1979, p. 75; anel Guimarães, 1989) . cation easier, but that restricted rnainly to intra-finn trade the access to the important developed country markets, in view of parent-subsidiary arrangements.
17
In short, Brazil continued with 8 trade regime that reflects neither static nor possible dynamic comparative 8dvantages, but rather an urge to save foreign exchange. As the regime did not become more selective and outward-oriented, the export drive had to bear the burden of an excessively protected, integrated and fragmented industrial structure, imposing heavy costs to the taxp8yer. Moreover, as export success never really became 8 necessaty condition for surviv81, it did not exert the necessary pressure on flrms to increase efficiency, and on the industrial structure to flnd sustainable conflgurations. For not increasing outward-orientation, Branl also missed the opportunity to have sustainable economic growth, combined with better resource allocation. The "miracle" was very much built on the Indebt- 3 Export-related imports consist of parts and raw material used in export production which were exempted from import anel indirect taxes.
Source: Original data from Kim, S. K. (1991, p. 33) , Hong (1979, p. 68) and KFrA (1989) for Korea; and from Bamnann (1990) anel Musalem (1983, p. 746) for Brazil.
17 Fajnzylber (1971) showed that in 1967, only 34 percent of the MNC's exports were to DC. BNDE (1988b) put the share of intra-fmn exports from American TNCs based in Brazil at 70 percent in 1977.
edness of a tiny tniddle-class, which could not keep on accumulating durable goods at 22 percent annual rate forever; and for all the improvements in labour absorption, Brazil's manufacturing sector continued to employ, vis-à-vis its share of GDP, far less labour than its capital-intensive DCs counterparts. 18 Apart from the trade regime, there are two other points worth making conceming financiai refonos, and S&T and education. As to the fonner, while they were successful in improving the State's finances, and in providing funds for current activities, they failed to eradicate inflationary financing and to provide industry with a proper source of long-tenn funds. Inflation has never gone below 16 percent, and indexation was a mixed blessing. True, it allowed interest rates to be positive, and reduced the worst inflationary effects upon the govemment's income and the creditors' and savers' assets. Yet, those on fixed incomes continued to suffer, and as indexation swiftly spread throughout the economy (exchange rate, wages), relative price changes became increasingly difficult, since they were quickly fed into monetary correction and passed on to other prices. More to the point, in so far as indexation made the past inflation the floor to future price rises, inflation got increasingly resistant to any sort of therapy.
With respect to long-tenn financing, the stock-market boom soon proved to be ephemeral and the debenture market has never really taken off. Whereas risk-aversion and informational imperfections seem to have played a part, govemment policy was less than helpful. The combination of high inflation and short-tenn indexed assets made long-tenn investment in non-indexed assets even riskier. 19 Hence, BNDE and foreign loans continued to be the only sources of long-tenn funds. Even though access to these sources was increased, first by expanding .and redirecting BNDE loans to t4e private sector, and second, by the already mentioned new legislation to foreign loans, they remained well short of the industry's needs, particularly of those of LPFs. BNDE's manufactu:i.ng loans over the period were equivalent to only 19 percent of manufacturing investment, and the bulk of foreign loans went to State and foreign finos. In the face of it, LPFs, whose association with banks was forbidden by law, continued to rely heavily on internaI and inflationary financing for their capacity expansion. No doubt, a conduct that curtailed their chances of growth and diversification. For instance, the local finn's share of the top 25 and 500 finos' sales in 1974 was zero and a mere 39 percent, respectively (Exame, 
various issues).
As for education, investments in basic skills continued to be inadequate. As of 1970, the illiteracy rate was still high (40 percent in 1970), and less than half of the literate population over 20 had elementary education. Apart from efficiency implications, the scarcity conditions in the market for skilled workers seem to have contributed -together with the economy's product tnix and the high-inflation-cum-indexation policies -for the worsening of income distribution experienced during the 19608. 20 Finally, in spite of SNDCT investments, R&D expenditures remained inadequate (0.2 percent of GDP), and the fact that investments carne only after the heavy industry was set 18 In 1974, the differ.mce between the manufacturlng's share of GDP and its share of total employment was 14.4 percenl The same fipllC for the US and Canada was -0.8 percent, and -3.3 percent respectively. (ANESTBR & OECD, 1989.) 19 The total stock market value fell from 22 to 7 percent of GDP over 1972 -77 (Goldsmith, 1986 . The ratio ofindexed to non-indexed assets increased from 5 to 43 percentover 1965 -73 (World Bank, 1984 .
20 The share of the 20 percent highest income group increased from 55 to 62 percent over 1960 -70 (IBGE, 1990 up, and since the latter was done mainly through protected FOI, posed the problem of who would demand the top quality human capital, technologies and infrastructure that the SNDCf was proposing to deliver. This would hardly come from either the TNCs or LPFs. The fonner, because of their advantageous access to the parent's company technology. And the latter because they were either located in the light industry, where technology is easily acquired off-the-shelf, or were sustaining marginal positions in the heavy industry, with TNC competition leaving no option but to import technology.
Heavy Industry revlslted: the 1974-79 perlod
For all its shortcomings, primarily for its narrow ~ of growth, the pragmatic "miracle" could not last for long, but it took the oil shock in 1973 to convince the govemment that adjustments were necessary. Clearly something had to be done. In 1974, the corrent account deficit bit an unprecedented 6.5 percent of GDP and inflation was above 30 percent. The response carne with the Second National Development Plan -11 NDP -(1974-79) . By then the liberal rhetoric had been forgotten, and the old structuralist analysis was back in business. The difficulties were put down to Brazil's unbalanced growth model, whose insufficient investments in the basic inputs and capital goods industry would have created inflationary bottlenecks and an undue dependency on imports. The therapy prescribed, then, was massive IS investments in these areas, wbich would concurrently promo~ structural adjustment and growth. 21 Even though it alllooks very much like the previous IS strategy, the plan signaled with a more favourable treatment for exports, and a more consistent approach to market failures.
For instance, it emphasized the need to carry out IS in conjunction with the promotion of exports and local private conglomerates, capable qf competing against TNCs b~ the scale, technology-intensive heavy industry. There were also references to sustainal>le market structures, technological capabilities, and to a new role for TNCs. They were now supposed to increase exports, carry out R&D, and fOM joint-ventures instead of taking over local finns. SEs, in tom, were seen continuing their investments in infrastructure and in key basic input industries such as steel, fertilizers, basic petrochemicals and mining.22 Before discussing the results of this neo-IS strategy, though, let us look at its policy mixo
Trade and exchange rate policies
The adjustments in the trade regime sought, in the short tenn, to avoid a BP crisis, and in the ~ong tenn, to carry out IS and to promote exports, in this arder of importance. Right from the start, a real exchange rate devaluation was ruled out on the grounds, first, that it would be ineffective given the widespread indexation and would increase inflation, and second, that it would impose heavy losses on externally indebted finns, and discourage further borrowing abroad (Stmonsen, 1988, p. 299) . Hence, the bulk of the changes was in the trade policy. On the import side, the govemment reintroduced a whole range of NTBs and raised tariffs, virtually banning consUlner good imports, anel imposing tough restrictions on those of intennediate and capital goods.
As to exports, the govemment increased subsidies (table A.S), the drawback was made more attractive by giving its users access to export fiscal subsidies, and the em began to suggest long-term export agreetnents (so-called Befiex), particuiarly to foreign firms, as a precondition to exempt capital goods imports from tariffs and NTBs (Guimarães, 1989) . This increase in incentives more than offset the appreciation of the exchange rate, keeping the PPP-export rate well above the 1973 leveI.
Financiai policies
The financiai side of the 11 NDP did not involve any significant institutional change, and the traditional combination of policy loans, foreign capital incentives and a pennissive attitude towards inflation continued to hold sway. There were, though, some adjustments. BNDE resources were beefed up by compuisory saving funds, allowing a significant increase in manufacturing loans, with the heavy industry anel LPFs being the major beneficiaries. 23 In addition, new BNDE programs were set up, seeking to offer competitive finance for the purchase of locally made capital goods; anel to capitalize LPFs, particuiarly in the capital goods and basic input sectors (Villela & Baer, 1980) .
As for foreign capital, there was a certain swing towards portfolio invest:ments, with restrictions being imjx>sed on FOI (see below). Yet, both forms of investment kept on growing rapidly. The average annual inflow of FOI during the period (US$1.1 billion) was well above that of the "miracle" (US$O.2 billion), whereas the externaI debt trebled to US$SO billion in 1979. This exceptional increase in foreign borrowing resu1ted largely from the govemment's strategy of using the cheap Eurocurrency funds available to finance the plan's investments and the BP. This strategy involved the concession of foreign borrowing incentives, the liberalization of domestic interest rates in 1976, and, as noted earlier, a passive exchange rate policy.
Finally, the govemment continued to look at inflation as a necessary evil, a price worth paying for growth and structural adjustment. To be sure, there were attempts to pursue a tight monetary policy but, as the finance minister of the day put it, "[they were] soon abandoned because wage-indexation was considered to be encouraging the wage-price spiral. Eventually the govemment chose monetary accommodation, which kept the annual inflation rates in the range of 30-40 a year unti11978" (Simonsen, 1988, p. 293) .
Industrial and S~ T policies
Part of what can be u."lderstood as the 11 NDP industrial policy was already discussed above, anel involved greater protection and subsÍdized credit to the capital goods anel basic input industries, in general, and for LPFs, in particular. These measures were supposed to be part of a broader strategy, which, as suggested earlier, aimed not onIy at catrying out IS but also at fostering large LPFs, sustainable marlret sttuctures, and technological capabilities. The pursuance of these first two objectives was left to the discretion of the govemment's loosely co-ordinated anny of federal, sectoral and regional incentive agencies -which still had the CDI fonnally on top -and to BNDE and SEs (through procurement).
These institutions, though, tended to have different interpretations of what would be a LPF or a sustainable matlcet structure. As a result, quite a few policy regimes emerged even in technologically related segments of the capital goods and basic input industries. In some sectors, strict investmeot licensing was enforced together with different sorts of FDI restrictions, ranging frotn the imposition of joint-ventures (e.g. petrochemicals and telecommunications equipment) to a complete ban on foreign finos (e.g. micro anel minicomputers). In others -the great majority -restrictions continued to be limited to localization requirements, and the objectives of promoting LPFs and efficient matlcet structures were left to BNDE credit and CDI incentives, despite the obvious limitations of these institutions.
As to technological capabilities, investments in S&T were significantly increased, particularly regarding graduate educatioo and research. 24 This was combined with initiatives aiming at fmancing R&D activities at the private firm levei, and at imposing stricter contrais on technology imports. The former was done through the concession of subsidized credit by BNDE and SNDCT institutions, and the latter by making new contracts conditional upon absorption of technology by the recipient finos. In addition, the SEs were used to foster the LPFs' technological capabilities by. favouring the purchase of locally developed capital goods, and by offering technological support (Villela, 1984) .
The results
The results of this neo-IS strategy are controversial. Enthusiasts argue, first, that economic growth was kept at a relatively high rate (6.4 percent), and exports, notably manufactured exports, continued to grow fast (6 and 16 percent, respectively), substantially increasing their share of world exports (table A. 3). Second, that export growth was accom-
Table4
Selected results of n NDP investments Exports dividcd by lotaI produclion.
Source: BNDE (1988b) for (a), Batista (1992) for (c) and (d), and mOE (1990) anel ANESTBR, various issues.
24 Elementary cducalion, though, conlinuod to bc ncglected. The SNDCT's sbare of federal expenditures, which average 0.4 pen:enl over 1970-73, increased to 0.9 percenl over 1974 -79 (World Bank, 1983 IBGE, 1990) . Graduale enrol1ments grew al annual average rale 18 percent over 1974 -79 (Caslro, 1989 .
panied by diversification towards the heavy industry, whose share of total exports rose frotn 18 to 43 percent over 1973-80. Third, that IS contributed not only to export diversification, but also to reduce dependency on producer goods (table 4) , assisting therefore in the structural adjustment whose first signs carne out in the early 1980s.2.5 Yet, critics draw attention to the costly macroeconomic side-effects, whose most obvious manifestations were a huge externai debt, whose service was taking up 62 percent of export revenue even before the 1980s shocks, and a record inflation (38 percent in 1978) fueled by indexation and by the deterioration ofpublic sector finances. The latter, provoked by the combined effect of the mounting indexed domestic debt, credit subsidies, fiscal incentives and the SEs' externai debt. In addition, IS contribution to BP adjustment is viewed with scepticism, particularly when measured by import coefficients, since these indicators would also reflect the slowdown in growth and investment during the 1980s. 26 Even though the task of disentangling macroeconomic from industrial strategy failures is fraught with difficulties, it seems that the problem with the neo-IS strategy went well beyond unsound macroeconomic policies. In fact, a case can be made out that these imbalances were just part of a series of adverse results, which were rooted in the govemment's failure to go beyond a mere patch up of the old IS strategy.
To begin with, despite attempts to increase the selectivity of the incentive regime, the clarnp down on imports and the lack of control over the allocation of foreign loans ensured that resources remained dispersed across virtually ali manufacturing activities, regardless of the existence of static or dynamic comparative advantages. This was made particularly worse by the increased obsession with localization indices. As a result, exports became an even more subsidized and costlier business (table 3) . Despite responding, they remained at 9 percent of the manufacturing output, and under 7 percent of GDP. Apart frotn efficiency implications, this result -given the low levei of imports -left the bulk of the BP adjustment to foreign loans, which in turn led to the debt build-up.
On the issue of targeting, whereas the potential static and strategic benefits of investments in the basic input and capital goods industries were unquestionable (as the export success of some of these industries was to prove), a number of considerations regarding the choice and implementation of the targets seemed to have been overlooked. Looking ftrst at the target chosen, there were still clear gains to be made frotn better resource allocation by promoting the light industry. Brazil's underemployrnent in mid-1970s was unabated and unit labour costs were still falling (Moreira, 1994) . This opportunity, though, was largely missed since, amid an incentive bias against exports, BNDE credits and fiscal incentives were concentrated in the heavy industry. As expected, the light industry's export perfonnance was disappointing,27 and labour absorption in the manufacturing sector slumped (table 2) .
Moreover, the technological and strategic externalities involved in the production of capital goods should have been set against: (a) the benefits of intra-industry trade and access to state-of-the-art embodied technology, and (b) the disadvantages of spreading scarce resources too thinly. Yet, although the ratio of capital goods to GDP in 1975 was lower than 2.5 Sec, e.g., Castro de Souza (1985) and Batista (1992) . 26 Sec, e.g., Balassa (1979) and Fishlow (1986) . 27 In faclo Brazil's share of world exports of textiles and basic industry incIeased significantly during lhe period (table A. 3). Yelo it remained unimpressive vis-d-vis other NICs. For instance, KOICa'S sbare of textile exports in 1980 was 5.5 times larger than Bmzil's. Sec Lucke (1990, p. 23). that of the US (Frischtak & Dahlman, 1990) , the govenunent went on to substitute as much as capital goods imports as possible.
As for implementation, despite the measures taken to promote LPFs and sustainable market structures, the results were mixed, and on the whole unsatisfactory. In the basic input sector, strict investment licensing, FOI restrictions, and greater outward-orientation seemed to have guaranteed plants dose to ~ MES and an efficient nwnber of producers, but SE remained the dominant player. In the capital goods sector, the fact that the TNCs were already firmly installed, combined, as noted earlier, with an inconsistent industrial policy, led to the entry of LPFs in already crowded and inward-oriented industrial structures. Apart from aggravating inefficiency, this process precluded LPFs from benefiting from economies of scale and specialization, doing no wonders for their learning process or for the prospects of a limited period of protection.
28
In view of this inhospitable environment, the objectives of fostering LPFs' technology capabilities and large private conglomerates turned out to be elusive. In the former's case, whereas the S&T infrastructure was significantly improved, its links with manufacturing remained weak. The available evidence suggests that the majority of firms did not go beyond the routine and adaptivefduplicative technological tasks. Durlng 1974-79 only 0.7 percent of the industrial ftrms conducted formal R&D, the great majority (63 percent) SEs, whereas the private sector's outlays on technology (R&D and royalties in 1978 and 1982) were under 0.2 percent of net sales. 29 As for large private conglomerates, the limited available evidence suggests modest advances. For instance, as of 1980 the LPFs' share of the top 100 non-financial groups' sales was only 30.7 percent, with TNCs and SEs taking 31 and 38 percent respectively (Willmore, 1987, p. 169) . At the fl11Illevel, as of 1980, LPFs had still only 6 percent of the top 25 firms'.
sales, 20 percent of the top 100, and their share of the top 500 fell from 39 to 35 percent over 1974-80 (Exame, varlous issues) . A comparlson with Korea is revealing. As of 1989, the sales of Brazil's largest private grOup (US$3.8 billion) were lower than that of Korea's twelfthjaebol (US$4.2 billion) (Moreira, 1994) .
Apart from these factors, the small scale achieved by Brazil's private groups seems to have also a bearing on the precariousness of the interventiori in the financiai sector. Despite the increase in BNDE credits, the LPFs' fmancing pattem did not change significantly during the period (table 5) . Retained earnings continued to be the main source of long-term financing, putting them side by side with American firms, even though they do not have anything like their size, or their access to intra-firm capital markets. Govemment intervention led to a financiai system that was neither credit nor capital market-based (Zysman, 1983) . Since BNDE, at its peak, did not controlled more than 8 percent of the private sector loans and private banks remained largely out of the manufacturing sector, LPFs have never had the amount of credit available to their, for instance, Koreans counterparts. On the other hand, high inflation-cwn-indexation continued to predude the development of a capital market.
In sum, for ali its success in deepening the industrial structure, diversifying exports, strengthening the LPFs position and improving the S&T infrastructure, the n NDP did not go far enough to change substantially the pattem of Brazil's industrialization. 'The incentive regime continued to be largely non-selective, inward oriented, anel exports a heavily subsidized and lesser business. Under total protection, 1ax investment and FOI licensing, fragmented anel inefficient industrial structures continue to survive and proliferated as IS moved upstream. On the fmancial side, the key issue of long-term financing for LPFs was on1y precariously 5Olved. In this 50rt of environment, the LPFs' growth was bound to be hampered and macroeconomic imbalances, inevitable, regardless of any macroeconomic failure. Rodrigues (1986) , for Korea (Amsden &. Euh, 1990, p. 66) and for lhe US (Ross et alo 1988, p.378). 6. The di.mal decade: the 1980.
When the interest and second oH shocks struck at the tom of the decade' Brazil could not be in a more vulnerable position. As noted earlier, a huge externaI debt had been accuQ1ulated, inflation was high and reinforced by widespread indexation, and oH made up more than one third of imports. In such a scenario, externaI shocks could only play havoc. In fact, the current account deficit reached 5.8 percent of GDP in 1982, and debt-service ratio 98 percent. Inflation, in tom, broke the three digit barrier in 1980. Unlike previous BP crises, this time there was no substantial imports to substitute, anel the option of "borrowing its way out the crisis" received its coup de grâce with Mexico's default in 1982. With little roam to manoeuvre and resorting to misguided stabilization policies, the govemment would pass the rest of the decade struggling with these macroeconomic imbalances, creating an environment of low, unstable growth and near hyperinflation, hardly appropriate to industrial development.
OB3/94
Facing chaos in the short-tenn management of the economy, and apparently influenced by a simplistic structuralist notion that the n NDP had completed industrialization, the govenunent would also forsake any attempt to fonnulate a IOO8-tenn industrial strategy. In practice, this meant that the previous pattem of intervention lingered on, and given the depth of the BP crisis and the sharp deterioration of the public sector finances, its shortcomings were fmther aggravated by extra cuts in imports, S&T expenditures, and curbs on 1008 tenn financing.
This troubled decade can be roughly divided in two periods, marked by different responses to the growing mácroeconom:ic difficulties. That is, the 1980-84 period, when an orthodox BP-adjustment policy was adopted, and the 1985-89 period, when the threat of hyperinflation led to a series of heterodox stabillzation plans. Let us look at their implications for industry.
Under orthodox adjustment
Living up to the country/s tradition, the govenunent's first response to the crisis was to try to adjust and stabilize the economy without hurting growth. Yet, the combination of devaluation with an expansionary fiscal and monetary policies led to a two-fold increase in infIation, wbile the BP situation continued to deteriorate. 30 The government, then, finally caved in, adopting an orthodox program in 1981. At first, given the previous experience, a real exchange devaluation was avoided (crawling-peg was reintroduced) and efforts were concentrated on restricting demand and escalating export subsidies and import controls. 31 The interruption of voluntary capital inflows provoked by Mexico/s default led eventually to a new maxidevaluation in early 1983.
These measures eventually adjusted the BP, with the current account showing a small surplus in 1984. Even though n NDP investments seem to carry considerable weight in explaining these results, the 34 percent growth in exports and the 39 percent falI in imports accumulated over 1980-84 cannot be dissociated from the ali-time bigh reached by export subsidies and import controls, and from the brutal tecession that bit the country. The GDP fell by 0.7 percent per year over the period. The aggregate investment ratio fell continuously from 21 to 16 percent.
Industry was severely hurt in this processo The shnnp in domestic demand, combined with restrictions on BNDE loans and bigh interest rates, led output to fali on average by 3 percent yearly over the period, whereas manufacturing investment fell 36 percent in 1981, and was around the 1976 levei in 1984. Among the manufacturing sectors, capital goods, a key n NDP target, were worst bit. Output in 1984 was 22 percent below the 1975 levei, and its share of manufacturing structure fell below the 1970 mark .
30 See Belluzzo & Coutinho (1983) for details.
31 During lhe Tokyo Round, Brazil had agreed lo phase out lhe fiscal subsidy lo exports mtil 1983. Yet, it was abruptlyellminated in December 1979. Wben minstated in 1981, it lost its product-specific character and a flat 15 percent rale of lhe export valne was lntroduced. This rale was lo be phased out mtil1983. In 1982, however, Brazil negotiated with lhe US, which was tlueatening lo impose comtervailing duties, the extension of lhe subsidy mtil 1985 (Cepal, 1985) . Moreira & Araújo (1984) estimated lhat, as of 1983, 75 percent of Iotal imports were affected byNTBs.
The depth and length of the recession helped to put into perspective the much-heralded good manufactured export perfonnance over period. True enough, Brazil managed to increase its share of world exports in most sectors (table A.3 ). Yet, despite the highest ever subsidies (table 3) and the collapse of domestic demand, the shift to exports was less than impressive, with its contribution to recovery coming only in 1984. Even then, exports made up less than 10 percent of the manufacturing output. The externaI consttaint argument does not seem to hold against the fact that countries like Korea increased manufactured exports at an annual rate of 12 percent against Brazil's 4 percent . More to the point, in the crucial machine and transport equipment sector, its share of world exports fell to 0.6 percento whereas Korea's nearly trebled to 1.9 percent (United Nations, lnternational Trade Statistical Yearbook and Handbook of lnternational Trade).
All those years of protected FOI, non-selective and inward-oriented incentive regime seem to have produced an industry that was not prepared to take on the international market.
An increase in the already comprehensive NTBs could only aggravate this situation. Estimates of effective tariffs put the average protection for manufacturing at lhe end of the period as high as 43 percent, with an inter-industry structure that bore no logic (table A, 1).
Apart from inefficiency, the prospect of having another period of unchallenged inward-oriented growth after the recession might have certainly precluded a stronger commitment to exports.
This scenario of falling output and investments, coupled with a limited shift towards exports, did no wonders for the industry's competitiveness. The static and dynamic diseconomies of scale associated with a prolonged recession added to the old problems of fragmented industrial structures and sub-optimal plants, causing labour productivity growth to plunge (3.1 to 1.4 percent over 1974-79/1980-88) . Moreover, investments in the modest S&T infrastructure feU 74 percent in real terms over -84 (Becker & Egler, 1992 .
Technology imports also fell by 35 percent over 1979-84 (Bacen) .
To complete the picture, lhe orthodox adjustment failed to stabilize lhe economy and ended up aggravating lhe problem. Inflation more than doubled to 213 percent in 1984, reflecting again the widespread indexation and the increasing deterioration of lhe public sector finances. Apart from turning cost accounting into a nightmare, this rampant inflation, coupled with short-term indexed assets offering stratospheric interest rates, made lhe prospect'of developing a proper source of long-term financing even gloomier. Not surprisingly, LPFs moved even further into internaI financing (table 4) .
Paradoxically, it was amid this inhospitable environment that lhe most important industry related initiative of the 1980s was taken. That is, the decision to consolidate the so-called market-reserve for mini and microcomputers, set up in 1977, and to expand it to much of lhe professional electronics industry.32 Among the severa! policy regimes originated in the late 1970s, this initiative stands out for its almost unique attempt to apply correctly lhe infant industry principIe. That is, to protect LPFs (instead of affiliates) in an industry where lhe importance of strategic benefits and positive externalities are widely recognized.
Unfortunately, lhe old IS mentality remained dominant. The govemment did not act as if it was keen on promoting an mternationally competitive industry. For instance, despite market imperfections such as R&D and production related economies of scale, lhere were about 37 different firtns producing PC-clones in 1985. Despite the limited human capital 32 Sec, C.g., Piragibc (1985) for ciclails.
base, and the benefits of intra-industry specialization, vertical and horizontal diversification was encouraged. FinalIy, despite the capital market failures, BNDE loans carne only late in the day.
The results achieved reflected these shortcomings. On the one band, despite the macroeconomic chaos, the local computer industry grew at about 23 percent annualIy during the 19805 (Evans & Tigre, 1989) , and .. the skilIed technical and engineering component of the labour force has grown substantialIy" (Hewitt, 1992, p. 196) . But on the other, after more than a decade of protection exports remained negligible and prices are said to be twice that of US, despite the obvious differences in quality (Schmitz & Hewitt, 1992) .
Under heterodox stabilization
If the implications of the orthodox adjustment for industry were disastrous, things were not much better under the heterodoxy. The BP adjustment gave the newly instalIed civilian government (March 1985) more rootn to manoeuvre, and after a short-lived austerity, economic policy became clearly expansionary. As a result, the recovery initiated in 1984 continued in 1985 with GDP growing 7.9 percent. Yet, the combination offast growth, a higher fiscal deficit and a food supply shock in a very closed and indexed economy put the monthly inflation by year-end at 15 percent.
Believing that indexation was to blame, the government launched the Cruzado Plan in February 1986 -a heterodox attempt to stabilize the economy that had at its core a pricewage freeze and the abolition of monetary correction. 33 Despite its initial success, expansionary fiscal, monetary and wage policies led to a consumer boom that, in turn, raised inflation to above pre-plan leveIs in early 1987. To add to the gloom, the frozen exchange rate coupled with the domestic bootn produced a 2 Percent of GDP current account deficit, which led the government to an interest moratorium in February 1987.
After this failure, another two stabilization plans were implemented (mid-1987 and early 1989) pursuing variants of the price-freeze-cum-desindexation formula, but combined with more restrictive policies. Even though they managed to slow down the econotnygrowth felI from 7.6 percent in 1986 to an annual average of 2 percent over 1987-89 -and adjust the BP, they both went down the Cruzado path. Initial successes were folIowed by unprecedented rates of inflation and re-indexation. By December 1989, inflation had reached a mind-boggling monthly rate of 49 percent. Underlying these failures was an increa5ingly intractable fiscal deficit approaching 48 percent of GDP in 1989. 34 Reflecting this highly unstable macroeconomic environment, the perfonnance of the manufacturing sector was erratic and on the whole poor. After growing on average 11.3 percent in 1985 and 1986, output fell annually by 0.3 percent until1989. Manufacturing investment in 1986 was still welI below 1980 leveis, and felI even further in 1987, folIowing the decline of the aggregate investment ratio. 3 !1 Labour productivity, in turn, stagnated around 33 For details sec, e.g., Modiano (1990) and Dinsmoor (1990 the dismal1980-84 leveis, and the whole decade produced the worst lcor of the post-war period (table A.2).
As one would expect, manufactured exports were aIso affected. Apart from the macroeconomic chaos, lhe steep appreciation of the PPP-exchange rate prompted by the price freezes,36 compounded by a substantiaI reduction of export subsidies, increased the incentive bias against exports. These events reinforced the export market status as a poor and occasional aIternative to domestic crises. This is clearly indicated by an export perfonnance that mirrored the "boom and bust" perfonnance of the internaI market, with exports growing on average 18.7 percent in the years of negative or no growth (1987/88), andfor declining when growth reswned (-0.2 over 1985/86 and -16 percent in 1989) . Not Surprl.singly, Brazil's share of world manufactured exports over 1984-87 fell or stagnated in most segments (table A.3) . This decline could have been worse had it not been for the long-tenn export agreements under the Befiex scheme, which forced finns to export whatever the costs, and that continued to receive, until 1989, the fiscal subsidy eliminated for the regular exports in 1985. The Befiex's share of manufactured exports rase from 17 to 40 percent over 1979-86 and reached 50 percent in 1989 (Baumann, 1990) .
In som, the impact of externaI shocks, magnified by previous misguided intervention in the product (trade bias) and financiai markets (indexation), largely reduced the govemment's action over the 1980s to a series of unsuccessful stabilization attempts. Facing a highly unstable environment, industry fell into a vicious circle of falling output, investments and productivity, which coupled with a higher trade bias, produced declining market shares abroad. nus decline in competitiveness, however, cannot be dissociated from the industry's structural weakncSses fostered by decades of an ill-conceived approach to market failures.
Concluslon
The mixed results presented by Brazil's industrialization seem to closely reflect the dubious quality of government intervention. Instead of being moulded and disciplined by international prices and market failures, govemment action was largely guided by the pressures to keep the economy growing at alI costs, and by the need to remove a perceived foreign exchange gap. nus, coupled with a solid export pessimism -deeply rooted on the backwardness caused by centuries of export-oriented colonial history -, set the stage for an industrialization sttategy that blindly followed the country's import composition. \ Whereas there is no doubt that this strategy was successful in turning an agrarian country into a highly sophisticated industrialized economy, the combination of wrong incentives and an inconsistent and often misguided approach to market failures led not on1y to a damaging waste of resources, but aIso produced serious structural weaknesses that compromised the industry's efficiency and competitiveness, while exposing the economy to violent macroeconomic imbalances.
Since the beginning of the 19905 the govemment has been striving to refonn the incentive regime. A program of import liberalizatiqn was adopted, which included the removal of NTBs and a four year advanced schedule for tariff reductions. 37 However macroeconomic 36 Tbc PPP-excbange appreciated by 55 percmt over -89. See Moreira (1994 . 37 For an analySÍli of lhe 19905 refonns see Erber (1992) . stability continues to be elusive, with yet another failed heterodox stabilization plano Moreover, the refonns have been taking place amid a liberal, anti-govemment rbetoric that threaten to throw away the baby with the bathwater. The source of most of Brazil's problems, as suggested, is not govemment intervention per se but the quality of this intervention. Deficiencies such as a weak local private sector, lack of long-term financing, low domestic technological effort, poor human capital base and limited S&T infrastructure are not going to be solved by macket forces alone. They all arise from macket failores and they all call for govemment action. Not of the type that Brazil had in the past, but one focused on remedying these failures, and disciplined by an open and outward~oriented economy.
TableA.3 Brazil's share of exports by economic group and sector -1950 group and sector - -89 SITC 1950 group and sector - 1960 group and sector - 1970 group and sector - 1975 group and sector - 1980 group and sector - 1984 group and sector - 1987 group and sector - 1989 ,
